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i. INTRODUCTION
It is becoming more and more common for state and national legisla-
tures to attempt to create civil penalties for criminal behavior.' Punishment
through civil sanction rather than fine or imprisonment allows for the avoidance
of many of the strict due process requirements that normally apply in a criminal
prosecution. This Note examines one civil penalty frequently used by those
prosecuting the war on drugs - Civil Asset Forfeiture. Civil Asset Forfeiture is
a tool commonly deployed by law enforcement agencies around the country to
seize private property that has been used to facilitate violations of various drug
laws. Within the State of West Virginia, civil forfeiture is carried out under the
West Virginia Contraband Forfeiture Act (WVCFA). 2 The WVCFA allows law
enforcement agencies to seize private property,3 have that property forfeited
through a civil proceeding,4 and then use the property to supplement their own
budgets.'
Civil forfeiture is utilized by law enforcement as a means to deter crim-
inal activity and to ensure that criminals are not rewarded for illegal conduct.
While the goals of civil asset forfeiture are legitimate, the means chosen to
achieve those goals pose a threat to both property rights and the right to due
process of law. This Note examines the policy implications of civil forfeiture
schemes like the WVCFA, which create incentives for law enforcement agen-
cies to engage in "for profit" policing. This Note will examine relevant issues
surrounding the use of civil forfeiture within West Virginia and suggest
amendments that should be considered in order to protect important constitu-
tional rights and eliminate the improper monetary incentive that forfeiture sta-
tutes currently create for law enforcement.
Part II of this Note examines the history of government forfeiture of
private property. This section also examines the difference between civil and
criminal asset forfeiture and explores why the government prefers to pursue
private assets through civil rather than criminal forfeiture. Part III examines the
modern procedure courts and law enforcement agencies employ when pursuing
a civil forfeiture case. Part IV examines the available defenses a person may
1 See, e.g., Haislop v. Edgell. 593 S.E.2d 839, 846 (W. Va. 2003) (holding that the West
Virginia Sex Offender Registration Act (codified at W. VA. CODE § 15-12-1 to -12-10 (2009),
which requires lifetime registration in public sex offender registry upon conviction of certain
enumerated crimes, is civil and non punitive in nature). See also W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-1
(2008) (provides for the revocation of a driver's license through a civil proceeding for the criminal
offense of driving under the influence); West Virginia Contraband Forfeiture Act (codified at W.
VA. CODE § 60A-7-701 to -707) (allows for the civil forfeiture of private property used to facili-
tate criminal conduct).
2 W.VA. CODE §§ 60A-7-701 to -707.
3 Id. § 60A-7-704.
4 Id. § 60A-7-705.
5 Id. § 60A-7-706 to -707.
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raise in a civil forfeiture proceeding. Part V considers the constitutional protec-
tions afforded a litigant defending against a civil forfeiture. Part VI examines
settlement of asset forfeiture litigation and looks at the role civil forfeiture set-
tlement can play in plea bargaining criminal convictions. Part VII examines
some of the potential problems created by the WVCFA. Finally, part VIII offers
a solution to some of the problems created by asset forfeiture legislation where-
by the current goals of forfeiture statutes can be realized without sacrificing core
American values.
II. HISTORY OF FORFEITURE TN THE UNITED STATES
Early English law recognized three forms of forfeiture: forfeiture con-
6
sequent to attainder, deodand, and statutory forfeiture. Forfeiture consequent to
attainder, the oldest and most widely used form of forfeiture, called for the di-
vestiture of a felon or traitor's entire estate.7 Persons convicted of treason for-
feited all their real and personal property to the Crown.8 Those convicted of
felony offenses forfeited their chattels to the Crown, while their real property
escheated to the local lord.9 An additional consequence of conviction for trea-
son or felony was the "corruption of blood." The commission of treason or
felony was said to have "corrupted" or voided the original grant of chattel or
real property from the King or lord to his subject; thus, an offender's heirs were
prohibited from inheriting any of the offender's property or chattels. 10 Forfei-
ture consequent to attainder had a dramatic impact on innocent family members
and descendants and for that reason was widely rejected in the American Colo-
nies. 11
Deodand forfeiture was employed by the King to confiscate animate and
inanimate objects that had directly or indirectly caused the death of one of the
King's subjects. 12 In deodand forfeiture, the property owner's culpability was
irrelevant. It was believed that the object, by causing the death of a person, was
itself guilty of an offense against God. 13 In order to prevent the object from
causing future harm, and as a form of biblical restitution, the offending object
was seized, sold, and the proceeds "paid in alms to the poor," to be applied "for
6 See JIMMY GURULE & SANDRA GUERRA, THE LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE 3-11 (1998).
7 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 See GURULE & GUERRA, supra note 6. at 9 10.
11 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 ("[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work corruption of
Blood or Forfeiture except during the Life of the person attained."). Many state constitutions also
contain provisions abolishing corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate. See, e.g., W.Va.
CONST. art. i1. § 18 ("No conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.").
12 See GURULE & GUERRA, supra note 6, at 5.
13 Id.
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the appeasing of God's wrath."' 4 Deodand's superstitious and religious founda-
tion led early American colonists to reject it, like attainder, as inconsistent with
their developing concepts of justice. 5
Statutory forfeiture authorized the government and private individuals
to confiscate properties persons had used to commit particular crimes.1 6 The
WVCFA is a modern form of statutory forfeiture. Early statutory forfeiture
commonly involved a violation of one of the many navigation acts. Throughout
the seventeenth century, the English Parliament passed various acts of trade and
navigation. The purpose of these various acts was to make the British Empire
more economically self-sufficient by requiring that British and colonial goods
be shipped in British ships crewed by predominantly British and colonial citi-
zens. 17 Collectors of customs were vested with the authority to enforce the trade
and navigation acts. Any violation of a trade or navigation act regulation could
result in forfeiture of ship and cargo to the Crown.' 8
Civil forfeiture in relation to navigation act violations was often accom-
plished through an in rem proceeding in which the sovereign proceeded directly
against the property sought to be forfeited.19 A vessel suspected of involvement
in a trade or navigation act violation would be arrested and prosecuted by
name. 20 The vessel was treated as if it were a living, breathing defendant ac-
cused of crime. Often the owners of offending vessels were unknown, unavail-
able, or out of the court's jurisdiction; accordingly, it made sense for the court to
proceed civilly against the vessel itself. The government sold the offending
property at public auction with the proceeds divided amongst the governor, the
21king, and any informer that may have led to the seizure .
After independence, forfeiture of vessels and cargo for violation of state
revenue laws through in rem proceedings continued. Civil in rem forfeiture
statutes subjected ship owners to loss of their vessels for regulatory violations
committed by captains and crew.22 In 1787, the first Congress enacted a statute
subjecting to forfeiture any ships and cargoes violating customs legislation. 23
This first federal forfeiture statute became a model upon which subsequent sta-
tutes were drafted and expanded civil in rem forfeiture to cases involving smug-
14 Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate 188 S.W. 54, 56 (Tenn. 1916) (quoting Sir Edward Coke).
15 Id. at 55 ("The doctrine [of deodand forfeiture] was deemed to be so repugnant to our ideas
of justice as not to be included as a part of the common law of this country.").
16 See GURUIE & GUERRA, supra note 6. at 10 11.
17 Id. at 11- 14.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 GURULE & GUERRA, supra note 6, at 11-14.
23 Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 5, 12, 36, 1 Stat. 29.36 37, 39, 43, 47 (repealed 1790).
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24gling, piracy, the slave trade, and violations of various revenue measures.
Early in rem forfeiture proceedings were an effective and efficient way to pu-
nish and deter conduct in situations where a court might not otherwise have
been able to exercise personal jurisdiction over an offending foreign ship own-
er.
2 5
Modern forfeiture statutes have clearly built upon the historical founda-
tion created by deodand and statutory forfeiture. Modern civil in rem forfeiture
has much in common with its ancient predecessors. Modern forfeiture is uti-
lized in an effort to achieve many of the same goals, including prevention of
criminal profiteering, abatement of nuisance through seizure of property, pro-
viding financial restitution to the community, and deterring criminal conduct.
Modern civil forfeiture also shares many of the drawbacks of ancient forfeiture,
including reduced protection for innocent owners, potential hardship to family
and descendants, reduced due process protection, and lessened focus on owner
culpability.
During the Prohibition Era, the government used forfeiture as a means
26
of enforcing various liquor laws. As the war on drugs began to intensify in the
1970s and 1980s, law enforcement and legislators came to rely more and more
on civil asset forfeiture as a tool to fight narcotics trafficking. 27 Prior to 1978,
the only assets that could be forfeited under federal civil drug asset forfeiture
law were illegal substances themselves and the instruments by which they were
manufactured or distributed. 28 Beginning in 1978, federal law provided for the
forfeiture of all drug proceeds and property acquired with proceeds from drug
29
sales. In 1984, Congress again expanded the reach of federal forfeiture statutes
by providing for the forfeiture of real property involved in drug sales or distribu-
tion.30
Federal contraband forfeiture statutes became a template upon which
many states based forfeiture statutes of their own. In 1988, West Virginia
enacted the WVCFA.31 The West Virginia statute is similar to the federal sta-
tute and invites state law enforcement agencies to get in on the forfeiture action.
24 See, e.g., Act of March 22, 1794, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 347, 349; Act of March 2, 1807. ch. 22,
§§ 1-2, 2 Stat. 426, 426.
25 GURULE AND GUERRA, supra note 6. at 13.
26 See National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (provides criminal penalties for posses-
sion of liquor, as well as civil forfeiture of intoxicating liquor and conveyances used to transport
them).
27 See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention & Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
§ 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1994)).
28 Id.
29 Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(a)(2), 92 Stat. 3777 (codi-
fied at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994)).
30 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention & Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306,
98 Stat. 1837, 2050 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994)).
31 W. VA. CODE §§ 60A-7-701 to -707.
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Forfeiture is defined as the divestiture of property without compensa-
tion.32  The government has at its disposal two types of forfeiture: criminal
33forfeiture and civil forfeiture. While both types of forfeiture achieve the same
end result, criminal and civil forfeiture are worlds apart in respect to the manner
in which they operate to divest a person of property.
Criminal forfeiture is defined as "a governmental proceeding brought
against a person as punishment for the person's criminal behavior. ' '34 Criminal
forfeitures are in personam actions filed in conjunction with criminal charges 35
and require that defendants first be convicted of an underlying criminal of-
36fense. Criminal forfeiture is considered during sentencing and may be proven
by a preponderance of the evidence only after a criminal conviction has been
plea bargained or proved beyond a reasonable doubt.37 By requiring a predicate
criminal conviction, criminal forfeiture affords a property owner all the constitu-
tional rights provided a criminal defendant and requires the state to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Civil forfeiture is accomplished through an "in rem proceeding brought
by the government against property that either facilitated a crime or was ac-
quired as a result of criminal activity. 38 In recent years, civil forfeiture has be-
come the preferred method by which government agencies divest private citi-
zens of their property.39
There are a myriad of reasons why the government favors civil forfei-
ture over criminal forfeiture. While criminal forfeiture requires the government
to first obtain a criminal conviction against a property owner, a criminal convic-
tion is irrelevant in a civil forfeiture proceeding.40 In fact, a property owner may
be acquitted of a criminal charge that later forms the basis for a successful civil
forfeiture action. 41 The standard of proof in a civil forfeiture proceeding is a
32 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (7th ed. 1999).
33 See generally 3 CRIM. PRAC. MANUAL § 107:4 (2008).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 DEE R. EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 5 (2nd ed. 2008)
3 FED. R. CRimm. P. 32.2(b).
38 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 661.
3 See GURULE & GUERRA, supra note 6, at 21.
40 See, e.g.. United States v. Cherry. 330 F.3d 658, 668 n.16 (4th Cir. 2003) ("The most nota-
ble distinction between civil and criminal forfeiture is that civil forfeiture proceedings are brought
against property, not against the property owner; the owner's culpability is irrelevant in deciding
whether property should be forfeited."); State v. Forty-Three Thousand Dollars & No Cents in
Cashier's Checks, 591 S.E.2d 208, 214 (W. Va. 2003) ("The forfeiture of items under the
WVCFA does not depend upon the guilt of the owner of the items. Instead, in a forfeiture action,
the question is whether the items themselves may be associated with criminal activity related to
controlled substances.").
41 See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984) ("[T]he
difference in the relative burdens of proof in the criminal and civil actions [permits the govern-
[Vol. 112
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preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.42
Forfeiture through a civil proceeding also allows the government to take advan-
tage of civil discovery. The government can request that a property owner an-
swer interrogatories, appear for depositions, and respond to requests for admis-
sions. 43 By proceeding directly against the property itself rather than a property
owner, in rem civil forfeiture allows the government to avoid many of the con-
stitutional protections that a criminal defendant would ordinarily be entitled to
44
receive. Civil forfeiture also allows the government to seize property before a
final disposition on the property or underlying criminal behavior is rendered.4 5
In essence, civil forfeiture has virtually replaced criminal forfeiture as an easier
46
and more efficient way of divesting private citizens of property.
III. FORFEITURE UNDER THE WEST VIRGINIA CONTRABAND FORFEITURE ACT
A. Property Subject to Forfeiture Under the WVCFA
The WVCFA codifies a system of civil forfeiture within the State of
West Virginia. The Act specifies the types of property subject to forfeiture and
basically provides that any property used to facilitate a violation of the West
Virginia Uniform Controlled Substances Act,47 or any property acquired using
proceeds of drug sales, may be subject to forfeiture.48 Included within the cate-
gories of forfeitable property are: contraband substances, raw materials or
equipment used to manufacture controlled substances,4 9 and containers used to
store controlled substances.50  Motor vehicles which are used to transport con-
trolled substances or are intended for use in transporting controlled substances
are also subject to forfeiture. 5' "Money, negotiable instruments, and securities
furnished ... in exchange for a controlled substance, [and] all proceeds tracea-
ble to the exchange" are all subject to forfeiture.52
ment to proceed in a civil forfeiture action against property despite the property owner's acquittal
on underlying criminal charges.]").
42 See, e.g., Forty-Three Thousand Dollars & Ao Cents in Cashier's Checks, 591 S.E.2d at
209.
43 See W. VA. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (2008).
44 See generally Jay Rosenberg, Constitutional Rights and Civil Forfeiture Actions, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 390 (1988).
45 W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-704.
46 See 3 CRIM. PRAC. MANUAL § 107:4 (2008).
47 West Virginia Uniform Controlled Substances Act, W.VA. CODE §§ 60A-1-101 to -11-6.
48 W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-703.
49 Id. § 60A-7-703(a)(2).
50 Id. § 60A-7-703(a)(4).
51 Id. § 60A-7-703(a)(5).
52 Id. § 60A-7-703(a)(6).
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The WVCFA allows for the forfeiture of money, automobiles, securi-
ties, and other forms of personal property upon a showing that the property has
in some way been used to facilitate a violation of the uniform controlled sub-
stances act.53 Even a misdemeanor, simple possession, or violation of the Uni-
form Controlled Substances Act could result in the forfeiture of a citizen's au-
tomobile, money, and other personal property.54
The WVCFA also allows for the forfeiture of real property, but only
when that property has been used in furtherance of a felony violation of the
Controlled Substances Act.55 Thus, real property will usually only be subject to
forfeiture if that property has been used in furtherance of a scheme to manufac-
56ture or distribute controlled substances. Essentially, a person's real property
should only be subject to forfeiture on showing that the property was used to
deal drugs or was purchased with proceeds from illegal drug sales.
B. Procedures for Seizure of Property Under the WVCFA
The WVCFA provides that property subject to forfeiture may be seized
upon process issued by a court having jurisdiction over the property, or seizure
may be made without process if specifically enumerated circumstances exist.57
Property may be seized without process if (1) the seizure is incident to a lawful
arrest or pursuant to a search under a search warrant,58 (2) the property subject
to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a prior
WVCFA proceeding,59 (3) the appropriate person has probable cause to believe
60that the property is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety, or (4)
the appropriate person has probable cause to believe that the property was used
or intended for use in violation of the West Virginia Uniform Controlled Sub-
stances Act.6 1 In the case of property seized pursuant to a determination that
probable cause exists to believe that the property was used or intended for use in
violation of the West Virginia Controlled Substances Act, the West Virginia
Supreme Court has defined probable cause as "more than a mere suspicion;
there must be reasonable grounds for believing that the property is subject to
53 Id.
54 W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-703(a)(6).
55 Id. at (a)(8) (providing for the forfeiture of any real property that has been used, or intended
to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of a violation of the controlled substances act
punishable by more than one year imprisonment).
56 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 60A-4-401 (prohibiting the manufacture, delivery, or possession
with intent to deliver a controlled substance and stating that a person convicted of violating the
section is guilty of a felony and may be imprisoned for up to fifteen years).
57 W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-704.
58 Id. § 60A-7-704(b)(1).
59 Id. § 60A-7-704(b)(2).
60 Id. § 60A-7-704(b)(3).
61 Id. § 60A-7-704(b)(4).
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forfeiture. 6 2 If a seizure is made without process, then forfeiture proceedings
must be instituted within 90 days of the seizure.63
C. Procedures for Forfeiture Under the WVCFA
Due process requires that a party receive notice and have an opportunity
64to be heard before being deprived of his or her property. The WVCFA re-
quires that "at the time of filing or as soon as practicable thereafter, a copy of
the petition for forfeiture shall be served upon the owner or owners of the seized
property, as well as all holders of a perfected security interest or lien ... if
known. 65 The state is required to make a "diligent effort" to locate all persons
66having an interest in property subject to forfeiture. A failure on behalf of the
state to notify a property owner could result in "dismissal of ongoing forfeiture
proceedings or the vacation of any orders entered in such proceedings. 67 If no
owner can be located through diligent efforts, then the state may satisfy the noti-
fication requirement through a class 1I legal publication 68 in the county "wherein
such property was located at the time of seizure and the county wherein the peti-
tion for forfeiture is filed., 69 A defending property owner has thirty days from
the date of service to file a response to a forfeiture petition. 70 Failure to respond
within thirty days will result in a default judgment forfeiting the property to the
state.71 If a response is filed within thirty days, then the court will set a date for
'72
a hearing on the merits of the case.
If a claimant fails to file a response within the required thirty days, the
circuit court is under a mandatory obligation to enter a default judgment in favor
62 Frail ex rel. State Dep't of Pub. Safety v. $24.900.00 in U.S. Currency. 453 S.E.2d 307, 311
(W. Va. 1994) ("[P]robable cause to believe that the property seized is subject to the forfeiture
provisions of W. Va. Code, 60A-7-701 et seq., must exist at the time the petition for forfeiture is
filed.").
63 W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-704(c).
64 See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993).
65 W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-704(b).
66 Id.
67 Games-Neely ex rel. West Virginia State Police v. Real Property, 565 S.E.2d 358, 360
(W. Va. 2002) ("The State's failure to effect service of a forfeiture petition upon all the owners of
property subject to such a petition ... may result in either dismissal of ongoing forfeiture proceed-
ings or the vacation of any orders entered in such proceedings, barring the State's inability to
identify all such owners despite diligent efforts to identify the property owners.").
68 A class 1I legal publication is defined as a legal advertisement published once a week for
two successive weeks in a qualified newspaper published in the publication area. W. VA. CODE
§ 59-3-2.
69 W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-705(b).
70 Id. § 60A-7-705(d).
71 Id.
72 Id.
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of the state. 3 However, the circuit court has discretion under Rule 60(b) of the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a judgment by default en-
tered due to a failure to file an answer within the required thirty day period.74
The WVCFA provides that a proceeding for forfeiture shall be characte-
rized as a civil proceeding. 75 "A forfeiture action brought under the [WVCFA]
is an action in rem that is brought against the item(s) sought to be forfeited, and
not an action against the owner of such item(s). '76 "A petition for forfeiture
may be filed on behalf of the state and any law-enforcement agency making a
seizure under [the WVCFA] by the prosecuting attorney of a county, or duly
appointed special prosecutor.",77 The WVCFA allows for the filing of the forfei-
ture petition in the circuit court of any county where "[1] the seizure was made,
[2] the real property subject to forfeiture is situate, or [3] . . .any owner of the
property subject to forfeiture may reside. 78 The WVCFA guarantees the right to
trial by jury upon demand of either party.79
At trial, the state bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence "that the seized property is subject to forfeiture pursuant to the provi-
sions of [the WVCFA]."80  The West Virginia Supreme Court explained the
state's burden as a requirement to "demonstrate by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that there is a substantial connection between the property seized and the
illegal drug transaction. This finding is in addition to the initial finding of prob-
able cause that an illegal act under the drug law has occurred."'"
In order to forfeit the interest of a holder of a bona fide security interest
or other valid lien in any conveyance, the state must prove "by a preponderance
of the evidence that the holder of the security interest or lien either knew, or had
reason to know, that the conveyance was being used or was likely to be used in
a violation of [the controlled substances act]. 82
IV. DEFENSES TO A FORFEITURE ACTION
A. Insufficient Nexus Defense
A person having an interest in property subject to forfeiture can raise a
number of defenses to the forfeiture. One method of defeating a forfeiture ac-
73 Games-Aeely ex rel. West Virginia State Police, 565 S.E.2d at 365.
74 Id. at 367.
75 W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-705(a)(1).
76 State ex rel. Lawson v. Wilkes, 501 S.E.2d 470, 475 (W. Va. 1998).
77 W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-705(a)(1).
78 Id. § 60A-7-705(a)(2).
79 Id. § 60A-7-705(a)(3).
so Id. § 60A-7-705(e).
81 Forty-Three Thousand Dollars & No Cents in Cashier's Checks, 591 S.E.2d at 213.
82 W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-703(a)(5)(iii).
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10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol112/iss3/10
CIVILIZING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
tion is by demonstrating that there is insufficient evidence to prove that the
property was involved in criminal activity.8 3 "The State, in forfeiting property, is
required to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a sub-
stantial connection between the property seized and the illegal drug transac-
tion. ' ,8 4 Factors that may lead to a finding of insufficient nexus between property
and illegal activity can include the following:
(1) absence of prior criminal arrests, convictions, or criminal
charge filed;8 5
(2) no contraband, paraphernalia, or weapons seized;8 6
(3) controlled substance amounts seized are consistent with per-
sonal use;8
(4) insufficient connection to criminal activity;88
(5) lack of a connection between the claimant and any known
criminal suspect or organization;8 9
(6) canine alert was unreliable; 90
83 See, e.g., State v. Burgraff, 542 S.E.2d 909 (W. Va. 2000); Frail, 453 S.E.2d at 307.
84 Forty-Three Thousand Dollars & No Cents in Cashier's Checks, 591 S.E.2d at 213. See
also Frail, 453 S.E.2d at 317 (Courts "have been careful to require that there be some nexus be-
tween the items seized and proof that an illegal offense had been committed or was intended.").
85 See United States v. One Lot of U.S. Currency Totaling $14.665, 33 F. Supp. 2d 47. 58 59
(D. Mass. 1998): State v. $107,156 U.S. Currency Seized. 41,090 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/06): 935
So. 2d 827, 836.
86 See United States v. Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars & No Cents in U.S. Currency,
258 F.3d 215. 219 (3d Cir. 2001): State ex rel. Means v. $1.354,450.50 in U.S. Currency, 841
P.2d 616, 618 (Okl. App. 1992).
87 Under the WVCFA, evidence that the amount of controlled substance found was consistent
with personal use and therefore misdemeanor simple possession would only work as a defense to
forfeiture of real property. W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-703(a)(8). As discussed above, personal prop-
erty can be forfeited for misdemeanor violations of the controlled substances act; therefore, show-
ing that the amount of controlled substance found is insignificant would not prevent forfeiture of
personal property if it could be shown that the property is in some way used to facilitate a viola-
tion of the controlled substances act. Id. § 60A-7-703(a)(6).
88 See State v. Giles. 29,695 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/18/97); 697 So. 2d 699, 706 (insufficient con-
nection to drugs); Jackson v. State ex rel. Miss. Bureau of Narcotics, 591 So. 2d 820, 823 (Miss.
1991) (vehicle not used in illegal transaction).
89 See United States v. $40,000 in U.S. Currency, 999 F. Supp. 2d 34, 239 (D.P.R. 1998).
90 Many courts have found evidence of a drug dog alerting to the presence of trace amounts of
narcotics on currency insufficient to establish a nexus between currency and illegal activity. See
Frail, 453 S.E.2d at 316 (A drug dog alert on currency "may demonstrate that the currency is
contaminated, but it does not demonstrate a substantial connection to any illegal activity on the
part of its possessor.").
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(7) large amount of currency were insufficient; 91 or
(8) insufficient tracing of proceeds to criminal activity.92
While the state is required to show a "substantial connection" between
the property sought to be forfeited and criminal activity, 93 exactly what consti-
tutes a "substantial connection" is difficult to define with any real precision. In
one West Virginia Supreme Court opinion, Justice Maynard, writing about the
substantial connection burden, stated that "at some point there must be a com-
mon sense evaluation of the facts. 94 A civil forfeiture litigant can attempt to
adduce evidence showing that there is no substantial connection, but ultimately
this is an issue that will probably be resolved by the finder of fact.
B. Legitimate Sources Defense
In a "legitimate sources defense," a claimant attempts to show that the
seized funds or property had an independent, innocent source and are not trace-
able to criminal activity. 95 Where forfeiture of property is based on the premise
that the property represents the fruits of criminal activity, the state bears the
initial burden of adducing sufficient evidence of a "monetary or other substan-
tial connection" between the property and the criminal activity that would allow
a jury to properly conclude that the property in fact represented the fruits of
illegal activity.9 6 Examples of evidence that a property owner could offer as
innocent sources for a defense to a proceeds theory forfeiture case include the
following:
(1) employment income,9 7
(2) business income,98
91 See id. ("The possession of large amounts of cash is not more indicative of drug sales than it
is of weapon sales. gambling, or a myriad of other illegal activities." (quoting United States. v.
$31.990 in U.S. Currency. 982 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir. 1993))).
92 See Burgraff 542 S.E.2d 909 (W. Va. 2000) (real property).
93 Forty-Three Thousand Dollars & Ao Cents in Cashier's Checks, 591 S.E.2d at 213 (W. Va.
2003).
94 Id.
95 See generally Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Evidence Considered in Trading Curren-
cy, Bank Account, or Cash Equivalent to Illegal Drug Trafficking so as to Permit Forfeiture, or
Declaration as Contraband, Under State Law Explanation or Lack Thereof 4 A.L.R. 6th 113
(2005).
96 Burgraff 542 S.E.2d at 911.
97 See Gatlin v. State, 846 So. 2d 1090 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002): Castelon v. Hudson County
Treasurer, 366 A.2d 1358, 1359 (N.J. 1976).
98 See United States v. 228 Acres of Land, 916 F.2d 808, 812 13 (2d Cir. 1990) United States
v. Miscellaneous Jewelry. 667 F. Supp 232, 240-41 (D. Md. 1987).
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(3) gambling proceeds, 99
(4) loans,100
(5) inheritance, 1
(6) gift,10 2 and
(7) sale of property10 3
Proving property derives from a legitimate source may not always save
the property from forfeiture. Property derived from innocent sources can still be
subject to forfeiture if the property was used or was intended to be used to facili-
tate a violation of the controlled substances act. 104
C. Innocent Owners and Bona Fide Purchasers
The WVCFA provides a property owner with a number of affirmative
defenses to a forfeiture action depending on the property sought and the owner's
interest therein. One defense provided by the WVCFA is the "innocent owner"
defense. 10 5 The innocent owner defense can be raised by a person having an
interest in a motor vehicle, money, negotiable instruments, or real property be-
ing sought by the government.10 6 In the case of an automobile, the WVCFA, in
addition to some protections for innocent common carriers and lien holders,
provides that a vehicle "shall not be forfeited under the provisions of [the
WVCFA] if the person owning the conveyance establishes that he or she neither
knew, nor had reason to know, that the conveyance was being employed or was
likely to be employed in a violation of this chapter."' 0 7 In the case of money,
negotiable instruments, and real property, the WVCFA provides that "no prop-
erty may be forfeited under this subdivision, to the extent of an interest of an
99 See United States v. Thomas, 913 F.2d 1111, 1118 (4th Cir. 1990).
1oo See United States v. Yukon Delta, 774 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1985); State v. $29,177.00
U.S. Currency, 93-592 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/2/94); 638 So. 2d 653, 655.
101 See United States v. 1998 BMW "I" Convertible, 235 F.3d 397. 399 (8th Cir. 2000).
102 See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 124 (1993); Magone v. Aul, 887
P.2d 1235, 1236 (Mont. 1994).
1o3 See Frail, 453 S.E.2d at 316.
104 The state is only required to prove "that there was a substantial connection between the
property seized and an illegal drug transaction." State v. Forty-Three Thousand Dollars & No
Cents in Cashier's Checks, 591 S.E.2d 208, 214 (W. Va. 2003).
105 W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-703(a).
106 Id.
107 Id. § 60A-7-703(a)(5)(ii) (emphasis added).
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owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been
committed or omitted without his or her knowledge or consent.""1 8
The statutory language seems to indicate that the innocent owner de-
fense is an affirmative defense that places the burden on the innocent owner to
establish that they are in fact an innocent owner. In the case of an automobile,
an innocent owner would be required to establish that they neither knew nor had
reason to know that their vehicle would be used in violation of the controlled
substances act.109 In the case of money and real property, the burden on the
innocent owner is less substantial and requires an innocent owner only to prove
that she had no actual knowledge that her property was being used in violation
of the controlled substances act. 110 Therefore, it would appear that while a truly
innocent but unobservant owner might succeed in a forfeiture action against real
property, money, or negotiable instruments, that same unobservant owner might
not be so successful in the case of an automobile forfeiture.
The WVCFA also provides protection for innocent, bona fide purchas-
ers. In a case involving a bona fide purchaser, the state is required to prove
much more than a mere "substantial connection" between property and illegal
conduct. The WVCFA states that the interest of a bona fide purchaser of real or
personal property may not be forfeited unless "the state establishes by clear and
convincing proof that the bona fide purchaser knew or should have known that
the property had in the previous three years next preceding the sale been used in
violation of [the West Virginia Uniform Controlled Substances Act]." '111 The
protection for bona fide purchases would serve to protect truly innocent buyers,
but would not prevent forfeiture in cases of collusive or bad faith transfers.
D. Bankruptcy Defense and the West Virginia Homestead Exemption
Some litigants have attempted to avoid state and federal forfeiture ac-
tions by filing for bankruptcy protection." 12 While the issue has not been defini-
tively resolved in all jurisdictions, the filing of a bankruptcy petition will proba-
bly not protect private property from forfeiture under the WVCFA. Ordinarily,
the filing of a bankruptcy petition acts as an automatic stay to actions brought
against the debtor or property of the bankruptcy estate. 13 One exception to the
automatic stay involves exercises of a government or agency's police power.114The majority view is that a civil forfeiture action falls within the police power
108 Id. § 60A-7-703(a)(7), (8).
109 Id. § 60A-7-703(a)(5)(ii).
110 Id. § 60A-7-703(a)(7), (8).
M W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-703(g).
112 See, e.g., In re Brewer. 209 B.R. 575, 577 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996).
113 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).
114 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).
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exception to the automatic stay; therefore, filing a bankruptcy petition will not
stay a pending civil forfeiture action.'
5
One defense that does not appear in any published West Virginia Su-
preme Court opinion is the "homestead exemption." Many states, including
West Virginia, provide residents with a homestead exemption in their state con-
stitutions.' 16 A homestead exemption allows a property owner to exempt a cer-
tain amount of property from forced sale to satisfy debt." 7 The West Virginia
Constitution provides that:
Any husband or parent, residing in this state, or the infant child-
ren of deceased parents, may hold a homestead of the value of
five thousand dollars, and personal property to the value of one
thousand dollars, exempt from forced sale, subject to such regu-
lations as shall be prescribed by law. 118
An exemption for $5000 in real property and $1000 in personal property
probably would not provide much relief for most forfeiture litigants, and that
may be the reason why the issue has not been raised in West Virginia. Howev-
er, other states have addressed this issue. A few states have found that their
homestead exemptions do apply in civil forfeiture cases and allow residents to
exempt certain property from civil forfeiture.11 9 Other states have determined
that state homestead exemptions do not apply in civil forfeiture cases. 20 A state
homestead exemption will also not protect property from federal forfeiture due
to federal preemption.1 2 1 This issue remains unresolved within the State of West
Virginia.
115 See In re Brewer, 209 B.R. at 577; see also In re Chapman 264 B.R. 565, 571 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2001) ("Because the government is a governmental unit exercising its police or regulatory
power against the Property in accordance with the requirements of § 362(b)(4), it can proceed
against the Property.").
116 See W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 48.
117 See W. VA. CODE § 38-9-1 to -9-6.
118 W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 48; see also W. VA. CODE § 38-9-1 to -9-6 (similar).
1"9 See, e.g, State ex rel. Braun v. 918 North County Line Road, 840 P.2d 453, 455 (Kan.
1994); People v. 1403 East Parham Street, 621 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Il1. App. 1993); Butterworth v.
Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56, 61 (Fla. 1992); In re Bly, 456 N.W.2d 195, 200 (Iowa 1990).
120 See e.g., In re Forfeiture of 5118 Indian Garden Road, 654 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Mich. App.
2002): In re Smith, 176 B.R. 221, 223 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995); In re 1632 North Santa Rita, 801
P.2d 432, 437 (Ariz. App. 1990).
121 See United States v. 817 Northeast 29th Drive, 175 F.3d 1304, 1311 (1 th Cir. 1999); Unit-
ed States v. Lot 5. 23 F.3d 359, 363 (11th Cir. 1994).
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN A CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE CASE
A. Constitutional Protections That Sometimes Apply in Civil Forfeiture
One of the most attractive aspects of civil forfeiture, from the govern-
ment's perspective, is the ability to obtain title to property without adherence to
many of the constitutional protections normally afforded a defendant in a crimi-
nal prosecution. Which constitutional protections apply in a civil forfeiture pro-
ceeding often depends on whether the proceeding is characterized as "remedial"
* ,,122or "punitive. A punitive forfeiture is considered to be a form of punishment
for crime. 123 As such, many of the rights protecting a criminal defendant will
apply in a punitive forfeiture. 1 4 A remedial forfeiture is not considered pu-
nishment for crime, and as such, many of the constitutional protections normally
afforded a criminal defendant will not apply in a remedial forfeiture.
125
While civil asset forfeiture is called a civil proceeding, in some circums-
tances the forfeiture could be so punitive as to constitute punishment which
grants the property owner constitutional protections normally afforded a crimi-
nal defendant.1 26 In determining whether a civil forfeiture constitutes punish-
ment, the West Virginia Supreme Court has adopted the two-prong test set forth
by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms.1 27 The two-prong test asks:
(1) whether the Legislature, in establishing the penalizing me-
chanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly that the statuto-
ry penalty in question was intended to be civil or criminal; and
(2) where we find that the Legislature has indicated an intention
to establish a civil penalty, whether the statutory scheme was so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention.
21
In answering the first prong, the Court determined that the Legislature
intended for the WVCFA to establish a civil penalty.129 In meeting the second
prong, the Court declared that "'only the clearest proof that the purpose and
122 See generally Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
123 Id. at 608.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 See, e.g.. State v. Nunez. 2 P.3d 264, 273 (N.M. 1999): State v. Casalicchio, 569 N.E.2d
916. 921 (Ohio 1991).
127 State v. Greene, 473 S.E.2d 921, 924 (W. Va. 1996) (citing United States v. One Assortment
of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362-63 (1984)).
128 Id.
129 Id. See also W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-705(a)(1) ("Any proceeding wherein the state seeks
forfeiture of property subject to forfeiture under this article shall be a civil proceeding.").
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effect of the forfeiture are punitive will suffice to override the Legislature's ma-
nifest preference for a civil sanction.1 30
In determining whether the purpose and effect of a forfeiture statute is
punitive, a court will consider the following factors:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
ment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of pu-
nishment - retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned....
While the West Virginia Supreme Court has never found any portion of the
WVCFA to constitute a punitive forfeiture, presented with the right case, forfei-
ture under the WVCFA could potentially be found to be punitive.
The type of property sought to be forfeited and the reason for forfeiture
can be important to consider when determining if the forfeiture is punitive or
remedial. Certain types of forfeitures are always considered to be remedial and
can never be considered punitive. Forfeitures involving (1) contraband, 132 (2)
instrumentalities, 3 3 (3) proceeds, 34 and (4) smuggled goods 3 5 are never puni-
tive. Forfeitures predicated on a facilitation theory are the only types of forfei-
tures that can usually be found to be punitive for purposes of determining which
constitutional protections attach.136 Facilitation property is property that is not
unlawful to possess, property that was not purchased with the proceeds from
criminal activity, and property that has not been directly used to commit an of-
fense. 137 Because the property was legal to possess and was not purchased with
130 Greene, 473 S.E.2d at 924 (quoting One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 365).
131 Id. (quoting One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 365 n.7).
132 See One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 364. Contraband forfeitures are always
remedial and can never be punitive because they merely remove dangerous or illegal items from
society. See id.
133 See United States v. Ahmad, 213 F.3d 805, 814 (4th Cir. 2000). Instrumentality forfeitures
are always remedial because they are limited to the actual property used to commit the offense.
such as money in a money laundering scheme. Id.
134 See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267. 291 (1996). Proceeds forfeitures are never puni-
tive because they merely take away illicit profits which a person has no legal right to possess. Id.
135 See Lot of Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972). Forfeiture of
illegally smuggled goods is never punitive because forfeiture "provides a reasonable form of
liquidated damages for violation of inspection provisions and serves to reimburse the Government
for investigation and enforcement expenses." ld.
136 See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 613 (1993).
137 See GURULE & GuERRA, supra note 6. at 149.
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proceeds from criminal activity, courts are more willing to consider "facilita-
tion" forfeiture to constitute punishment. 138  Facilitation forfeiture often in-
volves situations where the government is attempting to forfeit an automobile
used to transport contraband 139 or real property where contraband was stored or
distributed 140
1. Double Jeopardy
The Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause prevents multiple pu-
nishments for the same offense1 41 and applies only when a sanction is consi-
dered to be punitive. 142 The West Virginia Supreme Court has ruled that certain
portions of the WVCFA are not punitive;143 therefore, the Double Jeopardy
Clause will not bar civil forfeiture actions under those portions of the statute.
The Court has determined that forfeitures involving raw materials, manufactur-
ing equipment, and conveyances used to transport contraband are not subject to
double jeopardy guarantees. 144 The West Virginia Supreme Court left unans-
wered the question of whether forfeiture under other parts of the WVCFA could
be considered punitive and thus subject to Double Jeopardy protection.
Of particular importance, the Court did not determine if forfeiture in-
volving money 145 or real property 146 could be considered punitive for purposes
of double jeopardy analysis. While the West Virginia Supreme Court has not
decided whether a forfeiture action involving real property or money could be
considered punitive, such a question has been presented in other states with for-
eign courts usually finding that such actions are not punitive and are thus not
constrained by Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause protections.147
138 SeeAustin, 509 U.S. at 613.
139 See, e.g., United States v. One 1986 Mercedes Benz, 846 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1988).
140 See, e.g., United States v. Two Tracts of Real Prop., 998 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1993).
141 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,718 (1969).
142 One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 361 ("[N]either collateral estoppel nor double
jeopardy bars a civil. remedial forfeiture proceeding initiated following an acquittal on related
criminal charges.").
143 Greene, 473 S.E.2d at 922 ("West Virginia Code §§ 60A-7-703(a)(2) and (4) are not puni-
tive for the purposes of the guarantees against double jeopardy as expressed in the United States
and West Virginia Constitutions.").
144 Id.
145 See W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-703(7).
146 Id. § 60A-7-703(8).
147 See EDGEWORTH, supra note 36, at 270-74 (compiling a list of cases from various states);
see also Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, 690 A.2d 222, 226 (Pa. 1997); State v. Blackmon, 984
S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tenn. 1998). For examples of cases where courts have found double jeopardy
protections applicable in civil forfeitures, see State v. Nunez. 2 P.3d 264, 273 (N.M. 1999): State
v. One 1987 Toyota Pickup. 447 N.W.2d 243, 249 (Neb. 1989).
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2. Eighth Amendment and Excessive Fines
Another constitutional protection that applies only in punitive proceed-
ings is the prohibition against excessive fines. The Eighth Amendment Exces-
sive Fines Clause applies in federal civil actions if they are, in part, a punish-
ment. 148 The United States Supreme Court has determined that some portions of
federal asset forfeiture legislation are partially punitive and therefore subject to
Eighth Amendment restrictions. 149 Drafted in a similar manner with the intent of
achieving similar goals, it would be reasonable to assume that parts of the West
Virginia statute could receive similar treatment by the courts, and forfeiture
proceedings in state court under the WVCFA could also be subject to excessive
fines limitations.
The United States Supreme Court has never held that the Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 ° State forfeiture will never be considered excessive unless the
state forfeiture statute itself is amended to contain a prohibition against exces-
sive forfeiture or the state constitution is amended to prohibit excessive fines.
While the WVCFA itself provides no protection against excessive forfeitures,
the West Virginia Constitution contains an excessive fines clause similar to the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 151 Article III, Section 5 of
the West Virginia Constitution states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. Penal-
ties shall be proportioned to the character and degree of the offence."
'1 52
WVCFA forfeitures predicated on a facilitation theory could be chal-
lenged as excessive under Article Iii, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitu-
tion. Like prohibitions against double jeopardy, constitutional prohibitions
against excessive fines and disproportionate penalties generally apply only in
criminal proceedings and not civil proceedings. 53 While the West Virginia Su-
preme Court has not yet determined whether the Excessive Punishment Clause
could apply in a WVCFA forfeiture, the Court has found the Excessive Punish-
148 Austin, 509 U.S. at 609 10 (1993).
149 Id.
150 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22 (1989) (Court de-
clines to answer question whether Eighth Amendment excessive fines clause applies to states
through Fourteenth Amendment). Earlier Supreme Court decisions have held that the Eighth
Amendment excessive fines clause does not apply to the states. See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357
U.S. 371, 379 n.5 (1958); Walters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909); Pervear v.
Commonwealth, 72 U.S. 475, 480 (1867).
151 See W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5.
152 Id.
153 See State ex rel. Rufus v. Easley, 40 S.E.2d 827, 830 (W. Va. 1946). A civil action is not
subject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment nor to the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. Because there is no fine or punishment involved, a bastardy
proceeding is not criminal in nature and therefore constitutional prohibitions against cruel and
unusual punishment do not apply. Id.
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ment Clause of the state constitution applicable in other civil forfeiture cases.14
In West Virginia Public Employees Retirement System v. Dodd,155 the Court held
that the civil forfeiture of a pension under the West Virginia pension forfeiture
statute 156 was penal in nature and thus subject to prohibitions against dispropor-
tionate punishment.1 57 The importance of the Dodd case in relation to WVCFA
forfeitures lies in the Court's recognition that constitutional prohibitions against
disproportionate punishment can apply in civil forfeiture proceedings.
While in Dodd the Court failed to explain why the civil forfeiture of a
pension was penal in nature, the forfeiture was triggered by the pensioner's
criminal conduct. It would therefore be reasonable to assume that the Court
could find that forfeiture under the WVCFA is likewise "penal in nature" as
WVCFA forfeitures are also triggered by criminal conduct. Once a court de-
termines that a forfeiture is penal in nature the court will apply a two part test to
determine if the penalty is disproportionate to the character of the offense. 158
The first part asks if the penalty "shocks the conscious of the court." 159 A court
will consider "all of the circumstances surrounding an offense" to determine if
the penalty imposed shocks the conscience of the court.160 If a penalty is found
to "shock the conscience of the court[,]" then the inquiry is over and the penalty
is unconstitutional.16 1 If the court determines that a penalty does not shock the
conscience of the court, then the court examines the objective circumstances
surrounding the penalty to determine if the penalty is constitutionally dispropor-
tionate.1 62 The West Virginia Supreme Court has explained this objective test as
follows:
In determining whether a given sentence violates the proportio-
nality principle found in Article III, Section 5 of the West Vir-
ginia Constitution, consideration is given to the nature of the of-
fense, the legislative purpose behind the punishment, a compar-
ison of the punishment with what would be inflicted in other ju-
154 See, e.g.. W. Va. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Dodd, 396 S.E.2d 725, 732 (W. Va. 1990).
The Court was asked to determine if the pension forfeiture statute imposed an unconstitutionally
disproportionate punishment. The Court ultimately upheld the statute and found that it did not
impose an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment.
155 396 S.E.2d 725 (W. Va. 1990).
156 W. VA. CODE §§ 5-10A-1 to -10.
157 Dodd, 396 S.E.2d at 732.
158 See State ex rel. Ballard v. Painter, 582 S.E.2d 737, 740 (W. Va. 2003).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
[Vol. 1121010
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol112/iss3/10
CIVILIZING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
risdictions, and a comparison with other offenses within the
same jurisdiction. 163
Where the state is seeking to confiscate property that has been used to facilitate
a violation of the Controlled Substances Act, the property owner could seek to
show that the forfeiture is disproportionate to the gravity of the offense commit-
ted; it thus would constitute a violation of Article III, Section 5 of the West Vir-
ginia Constitution.
B. Constitutional Protections That Always Apply in Civil Forfeiture
While the constitutional protections discussed above apply only if a for-
feiture is found to be punitive, some constitutional protections apply in a civil
forfeiture case, regardless of whether the forfeiture is characterized as remedial
or punitive.
The United States Supreme Court has held that Fourth Amendment pro-
tections always apply in civil forfeiture cases. 164 The exclusionary rule applies
in civil asset forfeiture proceedings barring the use of evidence obtained in vi-
olation of the Fourth Amendment.1 65  However, the government may forfeit
property that is illegally seized if the government has sufficient independent
evidence to support the forfeitability of the property.1 66 "The mere fact of the
illegal seizure, standing alone, does not immunize the goods from forfeiture.,
167
Another constitutional right that always applies in civil forfeiture cases
is the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Fifth Amend-
ment can be asserted in a civil proceeding, 168 but its effect in a civil proceeding
is slightly different than in a criminal trial. While a defendant in a criminal trial
has an absolute right to remain silent and no negative inference can be drawn
from that silence,1 69 a civil litigant is not afforded such broad protection. In a
civil forfeiture proceeding, the Fifth Amendment does not bar the government
from requiring a claimant to establish standing by asserting a valid property
163 Id.
164 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth, 380 U.S. 693. 702 (1965) ("[T]he exclusio-
nary rule is applicable to forfeiture proceedings.") (cited with approval in Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602, 608 (1993)).
165 Id.
166 See John Bacall Imps., Ltd. v. United States, 412 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1969); see also
United States v. Twenty-Two Thousand, Two Hundred Eighty-Seven Dollars, 709 F.2d 442, 446
(6th Cir. 1983).
167 John Bacall Imps., Ltd., 412 F.2d at 588.
168 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441. 444 45 (1972). The Fifth Amendment Privilege
against self incrimination "can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or
judicial. investigatory or adjudicatory: and it protects against any disclosures that the witness
reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that
might be so used." Id.
169 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
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interest in the seized items. 7° Also, the Fifth Amendment cannot be used as a
substitute for a burden of proof that belongs to the claimant.1 71 One of the most
significant differences in the application of the Fifth Amendment in a civil pro-
ceeding is the ability of the court to draw an adverse inference from a claimant's
assertion of the privilege. 172 When a claimant does decide to assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege, he may also assume an evidentiary burden or restriction.
For example, a claimant may not invoke the Fifth Amendment during discovery
and then attempt to produce the same testimony at trial.
1 73
VI. SETTLEMENT OF ASSET FORFEITURE LITIGATION
Asset forfeiture cases are often resolved through settlement agreements.
The federal government has a policy favoring resolution of forfeiture cases
through settlement agreements.1 74 A property owner might agree to settle a for-
feiture case and give up a portion of his or her property in order to avoid a costly
legal battle. 175 Sometimes, a civil forfeiture case and a criminal prosecution are
resolved through a single, global plea agreement. A combined plea agreement
might allow a criminal defendant to plead guilty to lesser charges in exchange
for agreeing to forfeit certain property.
Criminal plea agreements resolving civil asset forfeiture claims raise
numerous ethical concerns. Criminal plea agreements should be based on the
severity of the criminal offense, a defendant's criminal history, and the danger
an individual poses to the community. 176 Allowing a criminal defendant to use
property as part of the consideration in a plea agreement creates an inference
that a defendant may have been given preferential treatment by giving up per-
sonal assets. Because the prosecutor's office and local law enforcement agen-
cies will be the direct beneficiaries of any forfeited property, 77 criminal plea
agreements resolving civil forfeiture litigation also raise conflict of interest is-
170 See Baker v. United States, 722 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1983).
171 Forty-Three Thousand Dollars & Ao Cents in Cashier's Checks, 591 S.E.2d at 214
("While ... [a claimant] certainly has the right to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege with re-
gard to the origin of [funds subject to forfeiture action], it is disingenuous to then ask this Court to
merely assume the funds are not from his illegal drug distribution business when [claimant] refus-
es to offer any other alternate source for these monies.").
172 See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment does not
forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to
probative evidence offered against them ....").
173 See In re Edmond, 934 F.2d 1304, 1306 (4th Cir. 1991).
174 See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ASSET FORFEITURE POLICY MANUAL 66 (2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/foia/docs/policy07.pdf.
175 See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEvY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 2-3
(1996).
176 See NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASSOC., NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 68.1 (2d ed.
1991) (1977), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/ndaa natl prosecution standards 2.pdf.
177 See W. VA. CODE §§ 60A-7-706 to -707.
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sues. A prosecutor has a duty to pursue criminal sanctions against those who
violate the law and to protect the public from those who pose a danger. 178 A
global plea agreement resolving criminal charges and civil forfeiture litigation
creates a conflict for prosecutors between their duty to protect the public and
their desire to supplement the budgets of their own offices and the budgets of
law enforcement agencies through forfeited property.
The U.S. Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual, while
permitting settlement of criminal charges and civil forfeiture cases in a single
global settlement agreement, places some restrictions on how combined settle-
ments are conducted. 179 The most important restriction imposed by the federal
policy manual is that government attorneys "should not agree to release property
subject to forfeiture (civil or criminal) in order to coerce a guilty plea on the
substantive charges, nor should the Government agree to dismiss criminal
charges in order to coerce a forfeiture settlement."' 180 While this may be the
written policy of the Department of Justice, it is difficult to know what the sub-
jective intentions are of parties entering into global settlement agreements.
The State of West Virginia has no written policy specifically addressing
the settlement of asset forfeiture cases through criminal plea bargains. Prosecu-
tors in criminal cases have wide discretion in deciding who to charge, what
charges to bring, and the manner in which charges are pursued. 181 Prosecutorial
discretion extends to deciding the terms of plea agreements and few hard and
fast rules exist to govern plea bargaining. The only real check on prosecutorial
discretion in making plea offers is the power of the court to reject a plea agree-
ment. 182 The court may sua sponte reject a plea agreement if the court feels that
an agreement is improper in some respect.1 83 Thus far, courts have been willing
to accept global plea agreements.
178 See W. VA. CODE § 7-7-2.
179 U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 174, at 69 70.
180 Id. at 70.
181 See, e.g., West Virginia v. Satterfield, 387 S.E.2d 832, 833 (W. Va. 1989) ("The prosecuting
attorney is vested with discretion in the management of criminal causes, which discretion is com-
mitted to him or her for the public good and for vindication of the public interest. Thus, the pros-
ecutor may decide which of several possible charges to bring against an accused.").
182 See State v. Waldron, 624 S.E.2d 887, 889 (W. Va. 2005). That case stated:
There is no absolute right under either the West Virginia or the United States
Constitutions to plea bargain. Therefore, a circuit court does not have to ac-
cept every constitutionally valid guilty plea merely because a defendant wish-
es so to plead .... A primary test to determine whether a plea bargain should
be accepted or rejected is in light of the entire criminal event and given the de-
fendant's prior criminal record whether the plea bargain enables the court to
dispose of the case in a manner commensurate with the seriousness of the
criminal charges and the character and background of the defendant.
Id.
183 I.
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While state law may not provide any real check against potential abuse,
some ethical guidelines exist to govern the pursuit of private assets through civil
forfeiture. The National District Attorney's Association ("NDAA") publishes a
list of prosecutorial guidelines that cover issues involving plea agreements and
resolution of civil asset forfeiture cases. 184 While NDAA guidelines do not spe-
cifically prohibit global plea agreements, they do urge that availability of forfei-
ture funds not "affect the proper exercise of the prosecutor's discretion in the
enforcement of forfeiture or criminal statutes."'1 85 In 1996, the American Bar
Association (ABA) adopted a Statement of Principles Regarding Asset Forfei-
ture.186 The thirteen ABA principles stress the need for simplicity of proce-
dures, a uniform innocent owner defense, enhanced burden of proof, and in-
creased use of criminal forfeiture. Federal civil forfeiture statutes have since
been amended in order to incorporate virtually all of the changes suggested by
the ABA. 187
VII. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE WVCFA
A. Disposition of Forfeited Property Under the WVCFA
This Note attempts to identify several potential problems with civil for-
feiture under the WVCFA. The first potential problem involves the distribution
of forfeiture proceeds. The WVCFA specifies how forfeited property is to be
distributed and places some limitations on how forfeiture proceeds may be
spent.' The Act requires that ten percent of forfeiture proceeds be given to the
prosecuting attorney's office that initiated the forfeiture proceeding. 189 The re-
maining funds must be deposited in a special law enforcement investigation
fund "administered by the chief of the law-enforcement agency that seized the
forfeited property."' 9" The WVCFA also provides for the equitable sharing of
proceeds when more than one law enforcement agency was "substantially in-
volved in effecting the seizure and forfeiture of property."' 9'
The WVCFA places some restrictions on the use of forfeiture funds in
an effort to discourage abuse, but these limitations may not go far enough. For-
feiture funds placed in the special investigation fund may be expended only to
"defray the costs of protracted or complex investigations, to provide additional
technical equipment or expertise, to provide matching funds to obtain federal
184 See generally NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS Assoc.. supra note 176.
185 Id. § 49.4.
186 See EDGEWORTH, supra note 36, at 303 05.
187 See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202.
188 See W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-706 to -707.
189 W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-706(a)(1). See also id. § 60A-7-706(d)(1).
190 W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-706(d)(1).
191 See id. § 60A-7-706(d)(3).
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grants or for such other law-enforcement purposes as the chief of the law-
enforcement agency may deem appropriate; however, these funds may not be
utilized for regular operating needs."' 92 The law enforcement agency making
the seizure is the ultimate recipient of ninety percent of the forfeited property
with few real limitations or oversight on how the monies may be spent.
The policing-for-profit system created by the WVCFA is virtually with-
out precedent. Various laws and regulations call for law enforcement agencies
to issue civil fines or to seize private property without the proceeds derived the-
refrom directly benefiting the agency making the seizure or issuing the civil
citation. For example, police officers often issue traffic citations requiring the
payment of a fine. The proceeds derived from the payment of traffic tickets are
193
not given directly to the agency that wrote the citation. Another example can
be seen in the disposition of property seized by conservation officers for viola-
tion of state game regulations. Under certain circumstances a game warden can
seize property involved in violations of state game laws. 194 The seized property
may be sold with the proceeds given to the state.1 95 The game commission rece-
ives no direct monetary benefit from the seizure.
One of the central themes behind asset forfeiture was that forfeited
property and proceeds from drug crimes could be seized by police and used to
assist in apprehending other violators of drug laws. In this way, the assets of
drug dealers could be used by law enforcement against other dealers. While
virtually every state and the federal government pursue asset forfeiture as a tool
in combating drug crime, the effectiveness of these programs seems doubtful.
Drug dealers are willing to accept the possibility of lengthy prison sentences and
even death to ply their trade, yet forfeiture of their assets is supposed to serve as
an effective deterrent? Law enforcement has used asset forfeiture as a tool in
the war on drugs for more than twenty years. 196 Despite seizing billions in as-
sets nationwide, 197 the government seems to have had little impact on the drug
trade or the availability of illicit drugs. According to a 2008 national survey,
eighty-four percent of high school seniors reported that they could obtain illicit
drugs "easily or very easily."' 198 Despite this ease of access, the same national
survey indicated that less than twenty percent of high school seniors had actual-
ly used illicit drugs in the month preceding the survey.1 99 While law enforce-
192 Id. § 60A-7-706(d)(2).
193 See W. VA. CONST. art. Xi. § 5 (requiring the net proceeds of all forfeitures and fines be
allocated to support public schools).
194 See W. VA. CODE § 20-7-8.
195 Id.
196 See GURULE & GUERRA, supra note 6. at 17 21.
197 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND AND SEIZED ASSET DEPOSIT FUND
ANNUAL FNANCIAL STATEMENT, FIscAL YEAR 2006 (2007),
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd afp/0 Iprogramaudit/fy2006/fy06 afs report.pdf.
198 http://bj s.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/dcf/du.cfm
199 Id.
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ment has seemingly failed to prevent access to illicit drugs, something has
worked to deter many young people from actually engaging in illicit drug con-
sumption.
While there are many theories as to what works and what does not work
in the war on drugs, it seems clear that law enforcement has failed in its effort to
put dealers out of business. In the war on drugs, resources should be directed
toward programs that deliver real results. Determining which programs are
worthy of additional funding is a job for local commissioners and state legisla-
tors. Should the state legislature or county commissions decide that allocating
more resources to law enforcement agencies is an effective way to combat illeg-
al drug use, then more funding should be allocated out of state and local treasu-
ries complete with the controls and oversight traditionally exercised by state
legislatures and county commissions.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the WVCFA is the total lack of ac-
countability for forfeiture proceeds. Allowing an agency to create its own fund-
ing through asset forfeiture removes many of the controls and oversights typi-
cally associated with public funding of government agencies. When a legisla-
ture or county commission decides to allocate public resources, policy determi-
nations are made by elected officials as to what level of funding is appropriate
for various agencies. Budgetary needs can be periodically reevaluated and deci-
sions can be made as to agency and program effectiveness. Elected officials can
then make determinations as to whether a particular agency or government pro-
gram is worthy of additional public resources. Allowing a law enforcement
agency to raise funds on its own through private asset forfeiture completely cir-
cumvents this budgetary process and prevents evaluation of agency effective-
ness. The proceeds of asset forfeitures are spent with little true oversight or
accountability. Law enforcement agencies are not accountable to the people of
their communities for the expenditure of forfeiture funds because forfeiture
funds are not derived from public coffers. Citizens and their elected representa-
tives have no say in how these funds are spent, or whether it might be more ef-
fective to use forfeiture funds to support other public programs such as drug
treatment or drug prevention.
B. Problems Experienced in Other Jurisdictions Relating to Civil Asset
Forfeiture
Virtually every state in the nation, and the federal government, have sta-
tutes that permit law enforcement agencies to reap a direct monetary benefit by
seizing property used in violation of drug laws. 200 This monetary incentive has
the potential to encourage agencies to investigate and pursue individuals based
on the amount of property they possess rather than on the threat they pose to
public safety. While this Author was unable to locate any case of record within
200 See EDGEWORTH, supra note 36, at 225 33 (compiling a list of state statutes on asset forfei-
ture and how the various states allocate forfeiture revenue).
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the state of West Virginia where a law enforcement agency was shown to have
been driven primarily by a desire to seize a citizen's property, the incentive for
this behavior remains, and it is impossible to determine what internal motiva-
tions might affect the expenditure of discretionary law enforcement resources.
Allowing law enforcement agencies to keep property they seize creates an ob-
vious potential for abuse and there have been documented incidents in other
jurisdictions where law enforcement agencies have abused their power in an
effort to supplement agency budgets through civil forfeiture.2 °1
On January 3, 1997, Dateline NBC ran a story on asset forfeiture abuse
* 202in Louisiana. The program focused on cases in which motorists were
stopped, arrested, and had their property seized without evidence of drugs in
203their cars. Most of the misconduct occurred along Interstate 10 in southwes-
tern Louisiana and often involved out-of-state, minority drivers.2 °4  Hidden
cameras used to record searches and seizures showed police officers stopping
the television crew for "violations" they did not commit and asking crew mem-
bers how much money they had.20 5 Louisiana law dictated that sixty percent of
206forfeiture proceeds would be given to the agency making the seizure.. Local
prosecutors were in the habit of settling forfeiture cases by returning a third or
207half of the property. Often property owners reluctantly accepted these pleas
rather than endure the expense and hassle of drawn out litigation.
201
Probably one of the most shocking cases of asset forfeiture abuse oc-
curred in 1992 when California Rancher, Donald Scott, was shot to death during
a drug raid on his 200-acre ranch.20 9 While authorities insisted the raid was
conducted on the basis of reliable information that Scott was growing marijua-
na, the local district attorney later concluded that there never was any marijuana
growing on the ranch and the raid was "motivated, at least in part, by a desire to
seize and forfeit the ranch for the government., 210 Similar to the WVCFA, both
California and Louisiana's forfeiture statutes permit law enforcement agencies
to keep the proceeds derived from the seizure of private property. The policy of
permitting an agency to reap the full monetary benefit of private property sei-
201 See generally LEVY, supra note 175. at 2 7; REP. HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY
RIGHTS: IS YOUR PROPERTY SAFE FROM SEIZURE? 12 15 (1995).
202 Louisiana Law Enforcement Stops Innocent Motorists and Seizes Their Property, Reports
ABC's "Dateline, "NEWS BRIEFS, Feb. 1997, http://ndsn.org/FEB97/LOUSIANA.html.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2616 (2008).
207 Louisiana Law Enforcement Stops Innocent Motorists and Seizes Their Property, Reports
NBC's "Dateline" available at, http://ndsn.org/FEB97/LOUSIANA.html
208 Id.
20o9 See Victims of Raids Have No Recourse, THE WASH. TIMES. June 16, 1993. at A5.
210 Id.
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zures has clearly proven to be a corrupting influence on some law enforcement
agencies.
C. Forfeiture Proceeds and the West Virginia Constitution
While allowing a law enforcement agency to supplement its own budget
through private asset forfeiture may be poor public policy, within the state of
West Virginia, it may also be unconstitutional. The provision of the WVCFA,
which allows a law enforcement agency to keep forfeiture proceeds, may violate
Article XII, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution. Article XII, Section 5
of the West Virginia Constitution provides that "[t]he legislature shall provide
for the support of free schools by appropriating thereto the interest of the in-
vested 'school fund,' the net proceeds of all forfeitures and fines accruing to this
State under the laws thereof...
The notion that the property distribution scheme of the WVCFA is un-
constitutional finds support in several West Virginia Supreme Court opinions.
In State v. Parkins,21 2 the West Virginia Supreme Court found a statute uncons-
titutional that provided for the deputy game and fish wardens to "receive for
their services the fines accruing from such prosecutions as may be instituted by
them. 21 3 Finding that the statute violated the West Virginia Constitution, the
West Virginia Supreme Court reasoned:
The Constitution commands that these fines go to the free
schools. The act is directly to the reverse, diverting them from
the free schools, and giving them entire to the deputy fish war-
dens - a glaring conflict. Whether, as the Constitution says
that the "net proceeds" shall go to free schools, the Legislature
could give a portion to the deputy warden, we do not decide, as
this statute gives them all of the fines, much or little, adequate
compensation or not. The schools get none of these many fines.
If only a fair part were given the informant, it might be said that
such part is cost, and the residue "net proceeds." But, when all
is taken, how can we consider it cost? A different construction
might cripple the schools.
2 14
While the Parkins case involved a fine, the reasoning and the ultimate
conclusion in Parkins would be just as applicable in a case involving a forfei-
ture. The West Virginia Constitution specifically provides that "the net
proceeds of all forfeitures and fines" be allocated to support public schools. 215
211 W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 5.
212 61 S.E. 337. 337 (W. Va. 1908).
213 Id.
214 Id. (internal citations omitted).
215 W. VA. CONST. art. Xi, § 5.
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The agency making a seizure under the WVCFA could be allowed to recoup
necessary costs, but the state Constitution seems to require that the remainder or
net proceeds be allocated to the public school fund.
The Legislature, perhaps anticipating a constitutional attack, provided
within the WVCFA a legislative findings section which states that the "seizure
and sale of items under the provisions of [the WVCFA] is not contemplated to
be a forfeiture as the same is used in Article XII, Section 5 of the West Virginia
Constitution. 21 6  While the Legislature may not have intended for forfeitures
under the WVCFA to constitute "forfeiture" within the meaning of the West
Virginia Constitution, whether or not WVCFA forfeitures ultimately are "con-
stitutional forfeitures" is a question for the courts to decide.2'
While the West Virginia Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to ad-
dress the constitutionality of the WVCFA as it pertains to distribution of forfei-
ture proceeds, the legislative finding that forfeitures under the Act are not con-
stitutional forfeitures has been directly questioned in at least one West Virginia
Supreme Court opinion. In Games-Neely ex rel. West Virginia State Police v.
Real Property,218 Justice Albright wrote separately to express his opinion that
"the language of Article XII, Section 5 [of the West Virginia Constitution] re-
quiring the net proceeds of all forfeitures and fines accruing to this State under
the laws thereof could possibly extend to and include proceeds realized through
forfeitures accomplished under the [West Virginia Contraband] Forfeiture
Act.' '21 9 Justice Albright merely raised the possibility that WVCFA forfeitures
could be constitutional forfeitures; the question ultimately remains unresolved.
VIII. SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE WVCFA
Many of the problems created by the WVCFA could be remedied with-
out significantly detracting from the Act's overall goals. This Note suggests
two specific amendments that the West Virginia Legislature should consider.
The first amendment involves a change in the process employed to affect a sei-
zure and forfeiture. The Legislature should consider replacing the current civil
in rem forfeiture system with criminal in personam forfeiture. While civil in
rem forfeiture may have previously been an appropriate way to deal with smug-
gling and piracy, when employed as a tool in the modern war on drugs, civil
forfeiture poses a threat to some of our most cherished rights. The circums-
tances that justified use of civil in rem forfeiture in the past to seize ships used
by pirates and smugglers are not present in most modern day drug cases within
216 W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-702.
217 See W. VA. CONST. art. V, § I (division of powers); see also Kessel v. Monongalia County
General Hosp. Co., 648 S.E.2d 366, 380 (W. Va. 2007) ("[F]undamental principles of separations
of powers preclude the Legislature from requiring the courts of this State to construe or interpret a
statutory enactment in a particular manner.").
218 565 S.E.2d 358, 365 (W. Va. 2002).
219 Id.
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the state of West Virginia. Today, most property owners can be located through
public records and courts can more easily obtain jurisdiction over those individ-
uals. While ship owners and others involved in smuggling and piracy were a
small portion of the overall population, today, persons involved with illegal
drugs make up a much greater part of our society. 220 Even entirely innocent
Americans could suffer property loss due to the actions of family or friends, or
at the very least, could be forced to endure costly and time consuming litigation
to defend their property from forfeiture. While it may have been appropriate to
hold a ship owner accountable for all activities that took place on board a com-
mercial vessel, that same rationale does not always extend to modern day own-
ers of family homes or automobiles.
Forfeiture of property under the WVCFA requires an underlying crimi-
nal act to have been committed before property may be forfeited. It therefore
makes sense that forfeiture should be done through in personam criminal forfei-
ture. Criminal forfeiture is a tool currently used in the enforcement of criminal
statutes. 2 1 A judge can consider whether to impose forfeiture as a penalty after
the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a property owner has vi-
olated the provisions of the West Virginia Controlled Substances Act. Criminal
forfeiture would still achieve the goals of deterring criminal conduct and pre-
venting criminal profiteering while at the same time ensuring that property own-
ers are afforded appropriate due process and innocent owners are not deprived
of their property rights.
The most important change in the WVCFA that the Legislature should
consider involves the disposition of forfeited property. Currently, forfeited
property is given almost entirely to the law enforcement agency that conducted
the seizure, with forfeiture proceeds being expended on future law enforce-
222ment. As discussed above, allowing a law enforcement agency to supplement
its own budgets through private asset forfeiture is poor public policy for a num-
ber of reasons. The WVCFA should be amended to prevent the seizing agency
from becoming the direct recipient of forfeiture proceeds. The West Virginia
Constitution requires that the net proceeds derived from WVCFA forfeitures be
deposited in the public school fund. The Legislature should consider amending
the WVCFA in order to comply with Article XII, Section 5 of the West Virginia
Constitution. The West Virginia Constitution requires only that net proceeds be
deposited in the public school fund. Therefore, the seizing agency and prosecut-
ing attorney could be allowed to recover reasonable expenses incurred in con-
ducting the seizure with the remainder given to support public schools.
220 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU STATISTICS, 2006 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON
DRUG USE AND HEALTH (NSDUH), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcf/du.htm#general.
Approximately 112 million Americans age 12 or older admitted to illicit drug use at least once in
their lifetime. Fifteen percent of those surveyed admitted illegal drug use in the past year. ld.
221 See W. VA. R. CRIM. PRO. 32(d)(2).
222 W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-706 to -707.
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While the benefits of increased drug enforcement are at best unknown,
there cannot be any dispute as to the positive benefits derived from a high quali-
ty education. Diverting forfeiture funds toward public education could serve to
help bolster struggling public schools throughout the state. According to United
States Department of Education statistics, West Virginia public schools rank
near the bottom of virtually every national survey comparing various aspects of
public education throughout the country.22 3 The salary for an average teacher
within the state is $10,000 below the national average. 2 4 Clearly, West Virginia
public education can use all the financial assistance it can get.
The Legislature's intent in allowing law enforcement to keep forfeiture
proceeds appears to have been to allow those funds to be used in combating
illegal drug use. Forfeiture funds given to the public schools could still be ex-
pended toward that end. Forfeiture proceeds could be used by local schools to
225hire highly qualified teachers, create after school programs, or to fund drug
226
and violence prevention programs. After school programs and effective drug
prevention programs can be at least as effective as law enforcement in deterring
young people from using illicit drugs.
While the West Virginia Constitution seems to require that forfeiture
funds be deposited in the public school fund, even if the Legislature fails to
bring the WVCFA into compliance with the state Constitution, the Legislature
should, nonetheless, still consider creating some form of political oversight over
forfeiture proceeds. At the very least, forfeiture funds should be given over to
state legislatures or county commissions that could decide how funds are to be
spent. One of the most effective ways for citizens to hold government agencies
accountable is through legislative control of agency budgets. Underperforming
or inefficient government agencies can be "punished" by having their funding
reduced or eliminated. Agencies making efficient use of public resources can be
"rewarded" by having their funding increased. Through this budgetary process
public resources can be allocated to their highest use and government agencies
can be encouraged to produce results. Allowing agencies to create their own
funding circumvents this budgetary process and removes an important control
citizens have over government officials.
223 NATL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/states (click on
West Virginia; select subject, grade level, and year; click "compare").
224 Associated Press, W State of the State: Proposed Teacher Pay Boost May Not Satisfy Un-
ions, WSAZ NEWS CHANNEL, Jan. 9. 2008. http://www.wsaz.com/political/headlines/
13573337.html.
225 Studies have shown that afterschool programs can help keep at risk kids away from drugs,
reduce dropout rates, and improve students' grades. See After School Alliance. Aftersehool Pro-
grams: Making a Difference in America's Communities by Improving Academic Achievement,
Keeping Kids Safe and Helping Working Families, Feb. 2008,
http://www.afterschoolalliance.org/outcomes / 20summary / 20february / 202008 FINAL.pdf.
226 See W. VA. CODE § 18-2-7b (requires the state board of education to create drug prevention
and violence reduction programs).
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Allowing legislative control over forfeiture funds does not necessarily
mean seizing agencies lose out entirely on forfeiture funds. Local commissions
or state legislatures could make evaluations of agency need and effectiveness
and could re-allocate funding back to a seizing agency if it is determined that
such funding is a wise use of public resources. In this way, funding could be
directed to agencies or areas of the state where funds are most needed and law
enforcement agencies could be encouraged to produce results that would war-
rant further support.
IX. CONCLUSION
Most property rights are created through state law, and property is held
subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by state legislatures. It is certainly
reasonable for a state to impose restrictions on property ownership whereby
property rights will be lost if property is used to facilitate criminal conduct or
has been acquired using ill gotten gains. This Note does not suggest that drug
dealers should be permitted to keep the proceeds derived from illegal activity.
The central theme behind the WVCFA is valid - no person should be permitted
to profit from engaging in criminal activity. This Note merely suggests that the
means employed to achieve that goal should be modified slightly.
Forfeiture revenues are public resources and should not be retained in
their entirety by a single law enforcement agency fortunate enough to have
stumbled upon the assets of a drug dealer in their jurisdiction. Forfeitures con-
ducted in state court, pursuant to state law, are done in the name of all residents
of the state, and the proceeds from those forfeitures should be spent like any
other public funds complete with the same political oversights. Altering the
manner in which forfeitures are conducted and the way in which forfeiture funds
are spent could serve to strengthen the ultimate goals sought to be achieved by
forfeiture law while at the same time ensuring that fundamental American val-
ues are respected.
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